UK Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard and AI use cases

Annex III point 5(a): AI systems used by or on behalf of public authorities to evaluate the eligibility of natural persons for essential public assistance benefits and services, or to grant, reduce, revoke or reclaim them. A fundamental rights impact assessment (Article 27) is required before a public body deploys it. A design that scores people over time on their social behaviour or personal characteristics and leads to unrelated or disproportionate detrimental treatment would fall under the Article 5(1)(c) prohibition on social scoring.

Annex III point 5(a) makes AI high risk when it is used by or on behalf of public authorities to evaluate the eligibility of natural persons for essential public assistance benefits and services, or to grant, reduce, revoke or reclaim them. An assistant that only explains rules and guides applications carries the Article 50 transparency duties (limited risk); one that screens or scores eligibility falls under point 5(a), and a public body deploying it must carry out a fundamental rights impact assessment first (Article 27).

Annex III point 8(a) makes AI high risk when it is intended to assist a judicial authority in researching and interpreting facts and the law and in applying the law to a concrete set of facts. Tools for prosecutors fall under point 6(c) if they evaluate the reliability of evidence, and tools that assist the examination of asylum, visa or residence applications fall under point 7(c). Under Article 6(3) a system that only performs a narrow procedural task or a preparatory task, such as organising a file or transcribing and summarising it for the person who decides, may not be high risk, but the provider must document that assessment (Article 6(4)). Summaries of internal legal advice for government lawyers, as Amsterdam plans, are generally outside Annex III.

Annex III point 7(c) makes AI high risk when it assists public authorities in examining applications for asylum, visas or residence permits, including assessing the reliability of evidence. Applicant facing information assistants that give general guidance fall under the Article 50 transparency duties (limited risk). Evidence classification, routing and interview support used in the examination are likely high risk, unless the provider documents under Article 6(3) that a component only performs a narrow procedural or preparatory task. That exception never applies to a system that profiles natural persons, which matters for routing on personal attributes or risk profiles.

Permit and licence decisions are not listed as such in Annex III, so officer decision support is usually minimal risk, and an assistant that talks to applicants carries the Article 50 transparency duty. The exceptions are permits in an Annex III area: examining applications for visas and residence permits (point 7) and evaluating eligibility for essential public assistance benefits and services (point 5(a)) are high risk. Solely automated decisions with legal or similarly significant effects on a person fall under GDPR Article 22 whatever the tier.

Prioritizing inspections of businesses and premises is not a use listed in Annex III, so such a system is usually not high risk. The assessment changes when it scores natural persons, such as individual licensed professionals or sole traders, and the inspectorate acts as a law enforcement authority: assessing the risk that a person offends, or profiling persons in the detection or investigation of criminal offences, is high risk under Annex III point 6 (d) and (e), and predicting that a person will commit a criminal offence based solely on profiling is prohibited by Article 5(1)(d). GDPR applies wherever sole traders, home based businesses or named professionals are scored.

Risk selection for administrative tax audits is not listed in Annex III, and Recital 59 says systems used by tax and customs authorities in administrative proceedings should not be treated as high risk law enforcement systems. Use in criminal tax investigations (Annex III point 6, law enforcement), or evaluating the eligibility of natural persons for public assistance benefits run through the tax system (Annex III point 5(a)), can make it high risk. When individuals are scored in administrative tax work, the GDPR applies, including its profiling rules (Member States may restrict some rights for taxation matters under Article 23). Article 22 applies when a decision with legal or similarly significant effect is taken solely by the model. Criminal investigations fall outside the GDPR and under the Law Enforcement Directive (EU) 2016/680 instead.

Transcribing and summarizing meetings for the participants is minimal risk. It becomes high risk under Annex III point 4(b) if transcripts are analysed to monitor or evaluate individual workers' performance or behaviour, and inferring participants' emotions from their voices or faces at work is prohibited by Article 5(1)(f). Recording and transcription also need a lawful basis and clear information to participants under GDPR.

An automated valuation model values the collateral, not the person, so it is not itself listed in Annex III; the EU Mortgage Credit Directive treats property valuation (Article 19) and the creditworthiness assessment of the borrower (Article 18) as separate steps, and Article 18(3) says the creditworthiness assessment must not be based predominantly on the value of the property exceeding the amount of credit, or on an assumption that the property's value will increase. The valuation becomes relevant to Annex III point 5(b), creditworthiness assessment of natural persons, only where its output is built into a separate system that evaluates the borrower's creditworthiness, and whether that happens depends on how the lender designs the credit decision, not on the valuation model itself.

Assistants that talk with residents must tell people they are interacting with AI (Article 50(1)), and AI generated text published to inform the public on matters of public interest must be disclosed unless it has had human review under editorial responsibility (Article 50(4)). Internal translation that neither talks with people nor is published carries no specific obligation. Translation can also sit inside an Annex III process, such as examining asylum, visa or residence permit applications (point 7(c)) or evaluating emergency calls and dispatching emergency services (point 5(d)). Whether the translation component is itself high risk depends on its intended purpose (Article 6(3) exempts systems that only perform a narrow procedural task); either way it should be governed with that high risk process.

An information assistant must tell people they are interacting with AI (Article 50). It is not high risk as long as it does not evaluate eligibility for public assistance benefits or services (Annex III point 5(a)); an assistant that starts to pre assess eligibility should be reassessed.

A taxpayer assistant must tell people they are interacting with an AI system (Article 50). It is not listed in Annex III as long as it only informs and applies fixed rules. It becomes high risk under Annex III point 5(a) if it evaluates eligibility for, or grants, reduces, revokes or reclaims, public assistance benefits (which can include benefits paid through the tax system). Recital 59 says systems used for administrative proceedings by tax and customs authorities are not high risk law enforcement systems; audit selection and risk scoring are covered on a separate page.

A 311 assistant must disclose that it is AI (Article 50). It is not high risk while it only informs and creates service cases. If it evaluates or classifies emergency calls or sets dispatch priority for police, fire or medical services, it falls under Annex III point 5(d) and becomes high risk.

An internal drafting assistant that an official reviews is not listed in Annex III. Article 50(4) requires disclosure of AI generated text published to inform the public on matters of public interest, unless it has undergone human review and a person holds editorial responsibility, which this design provides. If the tool is used to evaluate eligibility for public assistance benefits or services rather than to draft, Annex III point 5(a) can apply.

Tools that support staff in searching, deduplicating and proposing redactions are not listed in Annex III (point 5(a) covers eligibility for public assistance benefits and services, not access to documents), and every release decision stays with an officer. A public facing request assistant that talks to requesters would carry the Article 50(1) transparency duty.

Organising and summarising consultation responses for analysts does not decide on individuals and is not listed in Annex III, so no high risk obligations apply. If AI generated text is published to inform the public on matters of public interest without human review and editorial responsibility, Article 50(4) requires disclosure.